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I.

SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN RISK ASSESSMENT:

INTRODUCTION'

Both industry and worker safety advocates often complain
that our country's system of risk management for low-exposure carcinogens2 is not at a regulatory level sufficient to pro-4
vide optimal "benefits ' 3 to society in the worker safety area.
While industry may not consider regulations to be unfair on
their face, as they are designed to correct for market failures
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University, 1985; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1988; Law Clerk to the
Honorable Danny J. Boggs, U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1988-89. The author
would like to express his gratitude to Roger Pearce, to Professor Carol Rose, and to
the Environmental and Land Use Law Department of Hillis, Clark, Martin & Peterson
for their help while preparing this article.
1. This Article examines the problems of judicial reaction to scientific uncertainty
in risk assessment by OSHA because the OSHA substantial evidence standard and the
Benzene case's interpretation of it provide a good illustration of the basic problems in
applying traditional legal concepts of proof to areas in which only probability exists.
See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO V. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(the Benzene case). However, these same problems crop up in other agency risk
assessment contexts and in toxic tort causation as well. A judicial approach that
embraces and applies the scientific concepts of uncertainty and probability may
provide more satisfactory societal results in these areas as well.
2. In this Article, the term low-exposure carcinogens refers to those substances
which can cause cancer over long periods of time by exposure to amounts that are at
or near the detection levels of current scientific instrumentology, such as gas
chromatographs for organic compounds.
3. Although the term "benefits" has been ascribed various definitions depending
on the circumstances, in this Article the word "benefits" refers to any and all qualities
generally recognized by society as desirable as measured by "utiles" (an arbitrary but
constant unit of utility or value to society). In risk assessment terms, benefit can be
the level of health improvement from exposure reduction, though this is often difficult
to measure. Overall, the "optimal level of benefits" can be described as that point at
which utiles are maximized in a closed system.
4. In this instance, benefit refers to the anticipated level of risk reduction. Thus,
if it is hard to quantify the effects of regulation on risk reduction, it is hard to quantify
the benefits of a regulation.
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by internalizing certain costs such as lost productivity and
medical expenses,5 industry often considers the regulations to
be unfairly applied and overly expensive. Industry claims that
these regulations impose great cost on it both directly and indirectly, while the benefits are not certain or easily quantifiable.6
Many consumer and worker advocate organizations also
feel that the benefits of low-exposure carcinogen regulation
are not easily quantifiable. They would argue, however, that
society is not at an optimal level of regulation because benefits
are undervalued.7 Nowhere is this disagreement and uncertainty more apparent than in the case of suspected low-exposure carcinogens in the workplace. Such disagreements can be
expected to increase as more and more substances are recognized as carcinogens at low-exposure levels. The decision to
regulate such substances is clearly a congressional policy
choice. However, the ultimate implementation of regulations
depends upon our court system's analysis of agency regulation,
including analysis of the scientific data or evidence which the
agency relies upon in making its regulatory decisions. Congress provided the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) with the power to assure a "safe and healthful"
working environment for the nation's employees and the Secretary of Labor with the authority to promulgate occupational
safety and health standards which are "reasonably necessary
or appropriate" to accomplish this goal.'
This Article submits that the current judicial analyses of
scientific studies or data upon which OSHA relies in its regulation of low-exposure carcinogens are often uninformed and
inadequate, and that these analyses may prevent OSHA from
achieving the level of substance regulation mandated by Congress. This Article advocates an alternative approach to judicial review of the scientific evidence upon which OSHA relies
in its regulatory duties. A uniform judicial approach toward
the analysis of statistical evidence and the use of a scientific
master in judicial review may approximate more closely the
preferred level of regulation within the legal framework estab5. See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988) (Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2).
6. See, e.g., Stern & Taylor, Is the Golden State Losing It?, FORBES, at 86 (October

29, 1990) (a recent article decrying the effect of local environmental regulation on
business and industry).
7. See, e.g., R. KAZIs & R. GROSSMAN, FEAR AT WORK (1982) (arguing that
environmental regulation in the workplace is undervalued).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b), 652(1), 652(8), and 655(b) (1988).
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lished by Congress. This Article does not criticize the statutory requirements governing OSHA's regulation of lowexposure carcinogens; rather, it criticizes the judiciary's analytical approach to the evidence upon which OSHA relies when
determining appropriate regulatory levels of low-exposure
carcinogens.
This Article will examine the legal framework governing
OSHA risk regulation, the scientific studies and evidence that
the judiciary currently accepts for challenging or supporting
this regulation, and the effect of this standard of judicial
acceptance on OSHA regulation. This Article will then compare the present state of judicial analysis of scientific evidence
with alternative analyses in order to determine the most effective means of promoting a level of worker safety regulation
that creates the greatest benefit to society within the legal
framework established by Congress.
II.

CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

IN OSHA RISK ASSESSMENT CASES

A.

The Statutory Frameworkfor OSHA Regulation of Toxic
Substances

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) of
1970' seeks to "assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions."' Unlike other federal environmental regulatory agencies where rulemaking procedures are governed by the notice
and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act," OSHA must have a hearing with cross-examination
before it can promulgate rules.' 2 In order to attain the goal of
safe and healthful working conditions, Congress gave the Secretary of Labor the power to promulgate occupational safety
and health standards, which must be "reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment."'" If the standard involves a toxic
material or harmful physical agent, it is to be set at the level
that "most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
11. 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (1990).
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1911 (1990); Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting OSHA- Regulatory
Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 9 (1989).

13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8) and 655(b).
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basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suf14
fer material impairment of health or functional capacity.'
The Secretary's determinations are conclusive if "supported by
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole."' 5
The seminal case interpreting the OSH Act's standard for regulation of toxics is Industrial Union Department,AFL-CIO v.
The American Petroleum Institute,1 6 which is commonly
known as the Benzene case.
B.

The Benzene Case

In the Benzene case, the Supreme Court held that OSHA's
regulation lowering the exposure levels for airborne benzene
from a previously allowed exposure level of 10 ppm (parts per
million) to a proposed level of 1 ppm was an invalid exercise of
administrative discretion under the OSH Act. A four judge
plurality made up of Justices Stevens, Stewart, Burger, and
Powell held that the OSH Act required the Secretary of Labor
to make specific determinations and presumably held that
OSHA's evidence did not show a significant risk at a level to be
regulated. In other words, in order to regulate a toxic material
or harmful agent, the Secretary must determine that a significant risk exists at the present exposure level and that this risk
can be alleviated by the proposed change in the exposure
level. 1 7 Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the result and
thereby completing the majority needed to overturn OSHA's
action, found that the OSH Act was invalid as an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of Labor.
In Justice Rehnquist's interpretation, the OSH Act provided
the Secretary with no guidance on where to set a regulatory
standard."8 In a spirited dissent, Justices Marshall, Brennan,
White, and Blackmun attacked the plurality opinion's interpretation of what constitutes substantial evidence for purposes of
regulation.' 9
The Benzene case and the later Cotton Dust case 20 dictate a
two pronged approach to health regulations promulgated
14.
15.
16.
17.

29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5).
29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
448 U.S. 607 (1980).
Id. at 642-46; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(a) and 655(b).

18. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

19. Id. at 688, 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20. American Textile Mfgs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (the Cotton Dust
case).
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under the OSH Act.2 First, OSHA must show that the proposed standard will cause a reduction of a "significant risk"
specifically at the level being regulated.2 2 Second, the agency
must show that the proposed standard is feasible from an economic and technical point of view.23 What the Benzene Court
was less clear about, and what this Article examines, is the
proper judicial analysis of scientific evidence upon which
OSHA may rely in meeting the first prong of this test. In
other words, the Benzene Court did not make clear the kinds
of studies that will constitute "substantial evidence" to establish that there will be a reduction of a significant health risk.2 4
OSHA's findings are conclusive only if "supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. ' 2 However,
in judicial analysis of OSHA regulation of low-exposure carcinogens, it is difficult to determine what constitutes "substantial
evidence."
The Benzene Court did not define "substantial evidence"
directly. However, the Benzene case must be regarded as the
critical case in determining what constitutes "substantial evidence" for low-exposure carcinogen regulation. Benzene is the
only case in which the Supreme Court has examined evidence
relied upon by OSHA in the regulation of low-exposure carcinogens. Moreover, when interpreting "substantial evidence" in
low-exposure carcinogen cases, other federal courts have relied
on the Benzene Court's standard. 2' The Benzene Court never
specifically defined "substantial evidence." However, examination of the studies offered by OSHA in that case as evidence of
the need for exposure reduction and the Benzene Court's general approach and rejection of these studies provide a useful
picture of the Court's conception of "substantial evidence."
The Benzene Court's analysis included an evaluation of the
studies relied on by OSHA in formulating its benzene standard. OSHA considered both the nonmalignant and malignant
(carcinogenic) effects of benzene in establishing its standard
21. See Note, An Evolving Model for Judicial Review of Environmental, Safety,
and Health Rulemaking: Small Refiners Lead Phasedown Task Force v. EPA, 33
CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 1027, 1043.

22. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
642, 652-53 (1980).
23. Id. at 639-40; American Textile Mfgs. Inst, 452 U.S. at 506-08.
24. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 653; see 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
26. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. OSHA, 746 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984).
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for occupational exposure to airborne benzene.' In determining benzene's malignant effects, OSHA relied primarily upon
studies of epidemiologic data. However, the Court found these
studies flawed in two respects. First, some studies measured
the impacts of benzene at a level higher than the level regulated. Second, the other studies demonstrated effects from
exposure within the regulated range but in the presence of
other possible carcinogens.' s The agency did not construct a
dose response curve in which estimates of risks at lower exposures are derived from higher exposure levels, because it
claimed that it was impossible to do so without more certain
data.2 9 Instead, the agency relied on scientific opinions indicating that in several of the utilized studies, the risk of leukemia
from benzene was actually much higher than the studies had
indicated. 30
In its analysis of the evidence presented by OSHA, the
Court was somewhat fractured. The three judge panel, consisting of Justices Stevens, Stewart and Burger, held that "the
burden was on the agency to show, on the basis of substantial
evidence, that it is at least more likely than not that long-term
exposure to 10 ppm of benzene presents a significant risk of
material health impairment."' 31 Without examining the agency
evidence in detail, this panel found that OSHA did not meet its
burden of providing substantial evidence to support its regulation. OSHA had erred by relying on a "cancer policy" which
stated that carcinogens had to be regulated at the lowest possible level of risk.32 The panel thus rejected the notion that any
abstract scientific theory regarding carcinogenesis provides
substantial evidence upon which OSHA could rely in lowering
the exposure level of a proven carcinogen.
This three-judge panel also critized OSHA for failing to
supply a dose response curve which would have related the evidence of higher exposure effects to lower exposure.33 OSHA
did offer studies which showed a non-mathematical effect
between the two levels of benzene exposure. The Court appar27. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 697 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 633.
29. Id. at 702-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the dissent contains a thorough discussion
of all the evidence upon which the Secretary relied).
31. Id. at 653.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 653-54.
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ently rejected these studies because the industry challenger
suggested that a dose response curve could be feasibly
constructed.34
In his separate, concurring opinion, Justice Powell found
that studies showing an increase in cancer with benzene exposure of over 10 ppm and another study showing the relationship between cancer and benzene below 10 ppm did not
provide substantial evidence supporting a reduction in the regulatory level.3 5 In making this determination, Justice Powell
noted that OSHA's evidence not only failed to provide precise
numerical estimates of risks but also was not the "best available evidence."'3 In the absence of showing exact numerical
risk, "best available evidence" can constitute substantial
evidence.31
Even Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in the result but
voted to overturn the regulation based on the doctrine of
impermissible delegation of power, seemed to base his conclusion on the question of scientific certainty in providing substantial evidence. Justice Rehnquist would have invalidated
that part of the OSH Act that empowered the Secretary to promulgate standards for toxic materials or harmful physical
agents.3' Justice Rehnquist found this delegation of authority
inappropriate because the Secretary had stated that a safe level
of exposure was either unknown or not determinable from the
available scientific studies.3 9 It follows that Justice Rehnquist
viewed the evidence proffered by the Secretary as so inconclusive that the risk of exposure was unknown. Therefore, Justice Rehnquist's opinion indicates that risk assessment
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 654.
Id. at 667 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id.
Id.; see 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5).

38. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.

607, 687-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). J. Rehnquist would
have invalidated as an impermissible delegation of power the first sentence of § 6(b)(5)
of the OSH Act of 1970. 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5). The first sentence § 6(b)(5) provides that
"[t]he Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful

physical agents under this subsection, shall set a standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the
period of his working life." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5).
39. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 687-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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evidence that cannot provide an exact determination of a safe
level of exposure can not constitute substantial evidence.
When read together the studies relied upon by OSHA in
setting its standard and the separate plurality opinions and
concurrences of the Benzene Court begin to define the confines
of the "substantial evidence" requirement. These studies and
opinions make clear that substantial evidence does not include
studies which do not show a reduction in risk at the level
under consideration (either through direct studies or by use of
a dose response curve), studies which do not eliminate synergistic effects, and studies which do not indicate some definite
safe exposure level.
The Benzene case also indicated that the Supreme Court
had difficulties with basic scientific concepts when analyzing
OSHA's profferred studies. For instance, the reasoning of the
3-judge plurality in the Benzene case demonstrates a misunderstanding of the mathematics underlying the risk assessment
studies. The plurality makes the common mistake of comparing apples with oranges when analyzing statistical information.
First, the Court states that it is unreasonable for OSHA to regulate a chemical if studies indicate that only two lives will be
spared per 30,000 persons every six years.' The Court later
states that one life endangered per 1,000 (presumably over the
course of a lifetime, which could conservatively be estimated at
48 years) could reasonably be considered a significant risk.4 '
In the first instance, the Court is discussing excess deaths
in six years, whereas in the other it is presumably discussing
excess deaths in one lifetime. It is obvious that the number of
excess deaths due to cancer will increase between six years and
a lifetime. A comparison of the figures, by expressing the sixyear statistics in terms of one lifetime, demonstrates the
Court's confusion. Assuming a linear relationship between
years and excess deaths, the six-year figure can be expressed as
16 deaths per 30,000 workers (2 x 48/6). Therefore, the Court
has concluded without explanation that 16 deaths occurring
per 30,000 workers is not substantial evidence of a serious risk,
while 30 deaths occurring per 30,000 workers (1 x 30) is significant. These numbers differ by less than one order of
magnitude.
Other federal courts have attempted to apply the Benzene
40. Id. at 654.
41. Id. at 655.
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standard in the face of conflicting scientific evidence for lowexposure carcinogens. The Benzene Court's confusing interpretation of substantial evidence review has provided these
courts with little guidance. For example, in ASARCO, Inc. v.
OSHA' the Ninth Circuit attempted to establish a more logical
reading of the substantial evidence standard in relation to lowexposure carcinogens. However, a close reading of this case
indicates that it is not consistent with Benzene.
In ASARCO, the Ninth Circuit utilized the definition in
the Cotton Dust case and defined substantial evidence as "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."43 The ASARCO court claimed
that the Benzene case supported its use of this definition. Specifically, the court referred to language in the Benzene case
authorizing OSHA to use conservative assumptions in interpreting data and to regulate as long as its findings are supported by body of reputable scientific thought."
This is not the most logical interpretation of what constitutes "substantial evidence" in the context of low-exposure
carcinogens. First, the definition used in the Cotton Dust case
is a general interpretation under the OSH Act and does not
specifically address the kind of scientific evidence necessary to
meet the substantial evidence test for a low-exposure carcinogen. Cotton dust does not meet the definition of a low-exposure carcinogen. 45 Therefore, the Cotton Dust case does not
explore the requirement of scientific studies that provide substantial evidence at the point where exact predictions become
difficult. Furthermore, the Cotton Dust case does not focus on
the requirement that OSHA must show a significant health
risk. Rather, the Cotton Dust Court explores the second prong
of OSHA health regulation analysis, the requirement that the
regulation be feasible.4
The only Supreme Court guidance for the interpretation
of substantial evidence in the low-exposure carcinogen context
is found in the Benzene case, and ASARCO seems to misapply
this standard. The passage quoted from Benzene in ASARCO
42. 746 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984).
43. Id. at 490 (citing American Textile Mfrs. Inst., v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 522
(1981)).
44. Id. at 490 (citing Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980)).
45. See supra note 2.
46. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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reflects the views of the three judge panel only. Specifically,
Justice Powell did not concur in the section of the panel's opinion which discussed the substantial evidence standard. Furthermore, although the three judge panel did note that OSHA
did not have to support its finding with scientific certainty, the
same three judge panel stated that OSHA regulations must be
supported by evidence that shows that an exposure "more
likely than not" poses a serious health risk.4 7 This indicates
that the evidence must show some certainty and that an
agency's evidence must be stronger than that of the challenger.
Thus, the Benzene Court's real view of what constitutes
"substantial evidence" seems stricter than that applied by the
ASARCO court. As Justice Marshall noted in the dissent in
Benzene, the "existing evidence may frequently be inadequate
to enable the Secretary to make the threshold finding of 'sigAlthough the
nificance' that the Court requires today."'
ASARCO case may not accurately reflect the Benzene Court's
view of substantial evidence, it does demonstrate the confusion
which characterizes judicial analysis of substantial evidence in
OSHA risk assessment cases.
In the later case of Public Citizen Health Research Group
v. Tyson,49 the D.C. Circuit recognized the distinction between
the general interpretation of "substantial evidence" recognized
by the courts and the additional requirements for "substantial
evidence" set out by the Benzene Court.' In its eagerness to
provide a logical way of accommodating scientific uncertainty,
however, the D.C. Circuit did not follow the most logical interpretation of substantial evidence from Benzene.
In Public Citizen, the D.C. Circuit upheld an OSHA regulation based upon types of scientific studies that were implicitly rejected by the Benzene Court.5 The Public Citizen court
47. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 653.
48. Id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
50. Id. at 1485-86.
51. In the Benzene case, the "Dow" study showing a relationship between benzene
and leukemia below 10 ppm was rejected because of the presence of other chemical
risk factors. The "Dow" study was part of OSHA's evidence supporting regulation, and
as discussed, the three judge panel explicitly rejected OSHA's proferred reasons for
regulation, Justice Powell rejected the proferred evidence, and Justice Rehnquist
overturned the regulations because of uncertainty of the offered evidence. Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 633 (1980). The
three judge plurality explicitly required a relationship between harmful effects and
the regulated exposure level. Id. at 654.
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held that the studies relied upon by OSHA showed a causal
link between ethylene oxide and cancer, even though no quantifiable causal link was shown in one of the studies and there
were problems with synergistic reactions in another. 52
In summary, if an OSHA regulation of low-exposure carcinogens is challenged, OSHA may face judicial substantive
evidence review under the Benzene test which requires studies
of exposure either at the level regulated or related to the regulated level by a direct mathematical formula. Furthermore,
the studies must not have possible questionable features such
as synergistic effects, must utilize risk reduction terms understandable by the court, and must be definite enough to show
that the regulation will "more likely than not" reduce the significant risk. The actual requirement for OSHA, however,
may be uncertain and will depend upon the particular reviewing court's interpretation of the requirements of the Benzene
case.
III.

EFFECT OF COURT ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC STUDIES OF

Low-ExPOSuRE CARCINOGENS ON OSHA RISK
REGULATION

Several commentators have claimed that the Benzene
Court's analysis of the substantial evidence standard of review
has put an impossible burden on OSHA because the kind of
proof required to meet this legal standard for regulating lowexposure carcinogens may not be seen for many decades.5"
Specifically, these commentators claim that science cannot
meet the Benzene Court's requirement of direct evidence of
causation at particular levels. Science offers competing
hypotheses, but the Benzene Court seems to require one definitive answer. An examination of the scientific methods utilized
by OSHA in light of the legal standard lends support to this
criticism.
This criticism does not question the issue of whether
OSHA should be required to show that a new standard is reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk
of health impairment.'M Rather, it addresses the weaknesses in
the Benzene Court's opinion regarding the type of statistics or
52. Public Citizen Health Research Group, 796 F.2d at 1487-88.
53. See, e.g., Cranor, Epidemiology and Procedural Protection for Workplace
Health in the Aftermath of the Benzene Case, 5 INDuS. REL. L. J. 372, 379.
54. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8) and 655(b)(5); Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 642.
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studies necessary to show a relationship between cancer and
certain exposure levels.
Historically, carcinogenicity has been particularly difficult
to test because of the low levels of a carcinogen that may cause
cancer.'5 Because of the difficulty in testing at such low-exposure levels, carcinogenicity has typically been tested through
animal studies using a much higher dosage of the regulated
substance than that found in the environment or the workplace.'M Epidemiologic studies comparing exposure data and
disease incidence have become increasingly important in testing carcinogenicity. As detection instruments have become
more sophisticated, regulatory agencies have been able to
relate lower dosages of substance exposure to increased cancer
rates in humans.5 7 Animal studies and epidemiologic studies
remain the primary scientific methods of measuring health
risk from suspected carcinogens.'M However, neither standard
animal test studies nor epidemiologic studies, the best types of
evidence available regarding cancer risks, can automatically
pass muster under the substantial evidence standard of review
announced in the Benzene case.
Agencies still use animal studies to test carcinogenicity
because of the ability to rigorously control the testing environment. This type of study has wide acceptance in the scientific
and regulatory communities. However, animal studies of lowexposure carcinogens give rise to legal challenges because their
relevance to human beings at low-exposure levels depends
upon the construction of large dose response curves. The Benzene Court did not explicitly accept this methodology; moreover, because doses are not given at the "regulated" levels,
animal studies may well not pass muster under the Benzene
standard. 9 Even though the three judge panel in Benzene criticized OSHA for not producing a dose response curve, this was
in relation to human epidemiologic studies.60 The comparison
55. See Cranor, supra note 53, at 379.
56. Id. at 381.
57. See generally Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in

Toxic Tort

Litigation, 52 FoRD. L. REV. 732, 756-60 (1984).

58. Cranor, supra note 53, at 379.
59. A dose response curve attempts to extrapolate the effect of lower doses of a
suspected carcinogen to health risks by observing the relationship between higher
doses of a carcinogen and health impairments and then constructing a curve which
expresses the relationship mathematically.
60. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
653 (1980).
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of human to animal reactions is different and much more problematic. Substances that affect certain animals, even those animals closely related to humans, may easiy be challenged
because it is hard to prove that they affect humans in the same
manner.
Epidemiology's usefulness in proving relationships
between risk and exposure levels to low-exposure carcinogens
is also problematic under the Benzene standard. Epidemiologists study population groups to find statistical differences
between groups exposed to different environmental pollutants
or statistical associations between a single group and an environmental pollutant.6 1 This study is commonly retrospective.
First, medical records and past exposure histories of two or
more groups are selected in an effort to isolate possible exposure to the suspected carcinogen. Then, these records are statistically correlated with any differences in health problems
between the two groups. 2 Several well-known statistical tests
may be used to analyze these possible correlations. 3
However, epidemiologic studies often have complicating
factors such as exposures to other suspected carcinogens.
These synergistic effects render the epidemiologic evidence
less clear. For instance, the Benzene Court rejected evidence
offered by OSHA because of possible synergistic effects of
other substances." This demand for epidemiologic studies
without synergistic effects can result in a legal straightjacket,
because observational epidemiologic studies which separate
synergistic effects of all other exposures are rare.65 For example, the Dow study upon which OSHA relied in promulgating
its benzene regulation included exposure to other chemicals.
However, OSHA used other studies to indicate that the Dow
study was valid.6 Statistical studies that seek to screen out
synergistic effects are at present time routinely accepted in the
scientific community as valid. 7
In addition to problems separating synergistic effects, statistical epidemiologic studies may not produce a level of signifi-.
61. See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 57, at 761; Cranor, supra note 53, at 385-93.
62. See Black & Uilienfeld, supra note 57, at 761; Cranor, supra note 53, at 385-93.
63. The common tests are all algebraic equivalents of a form of normal curve used
to approximate the binomial distribution.
64. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 633-34.
65. Cranor, supra note 53, at 384.
66. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 699 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 57, at 757.
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cance high enough to be considered legally adequate.
Therefore, these studies may not meet the exacting evidentiary
standards of the Benzene case, which seems to require a direct
correlation of exposure to disease incidence. For instance, in
Asbestos Information Ass'n/North America v. OSHA, 68 the
Fifth Circuit purportedly relied upon the substantial evidence
standard of review established in the Benzene case in rejecting
epidemiologic evidence relied upon by OSHA. Although the
Asbestos Information court was only concerned with an emergency temporary standard, the court's application of the substantial evidence standard from Benzene revealed the
limitation of requiring such a strict standard of proof of epidemiologic studies of low-exposure carcinogens. 69 The studies
relied on by OSHA examined lifetime exposures, but the temporary standards would only be in effect for six months. The
court held, therefore, that the studies did not provide evidence
over the term of the exposure.7 ° Unfortunately, epidemiologic
studies can rarely be analyzed over such a short time period. 71
Thus, OSHA's primary tools for studying and regulating
the risk of exposure to carcinogens-animal studies and epidemiology-may not be very useful in meeting the Benzene
Court's substantial evidence requirement in relation to OSHA
regulation of low-exposure carcinogens.
OSHA's attempt to promulgate new regulations governing
benzene is a good example of its dilemma in trying to meet the
Benzene Court's standard.7 2 Relying on new mathematical
analyses of prior studies, and using new studies as well, OSHA
repromulgated the benzene standards that the Supreme Court
struck down in the Benzene case as being unsupported by "substantial evidence." OSHA had seven years to prepare its new
regulations between the Supreme Court's rejection of its former benzene standard and the time of its new promulgation of
benzene standards. When repromulgating these regulations,
OSHA was very careful to address specific questions raised by
the Court about its method of determining risks. However, the
agency still has not produced a standard that can unequivocally
meet the Benzene Court's evidentiary requirements.
68. 727 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1984).
69. See id.
70. Id. at 425-26.
71. See id.
72. See 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460 through 34,578 (Sept. 11, 1987) ("Occupational
Exposure to Benzene") (codified in part at 29 C.F.R. 1910.1028 (1990)).
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For example, when promulgating the new benzene regulations in 1987, OSHA claimed that it was very careful to lower
the allowed exposure standard only to levels where some statistical evidence showed a direct correlation between the lower
exposure level and a change in the risk of carcinogenesis. 7s
However, OSHA may not be able to prove to a court's satisfaction that the scientific evidence relied upon substantially supported its new conclusions because a court could rely on an
alternative mathematical interpretation of this data presented
by a challenger to the regulation.
In attempting to prove the necessity for a lower exposure
level for benzene in its new regulations, OSHA focused on epidemiologic studies in the range to be regulated (less than 10
ppm/TWA exposure to approximately 5 ppm). It also cited several major epidemiologic studies that evaluated benzene's rela74
tion to leukemia at exposures of between 10 ppm and 1 ppm
It then reported a statistical analysis of these sets of epidemiological data even though some of the data did not show correlations at the lowered exposure levels.75 OSHA concluded that a
reduction of the exposure standard would result in a reduction
in excess deaths of over 85 persons per 1,000.76
The American Petroleum Institute has already paved the
way for a possible legal challenge regarding these statistics by
conducting a different statistical analysis of the same data.77
Interpreting the same data used by OSHA, the API concluded
that there might be only eight excess deaths or lower per 1,000
persons at a 10 ppm exposure level. 7 These statistical analyses
may not be equally justified. However, a scientifically uninformed court could well conclude that OSHA had failed to
prove the necessary relationship between risk and exposure
level. When faced with such opposing studies or opposing
73. See 52 Fed. Reg. 34,461-63.
74. 52 Fed. Reg. 34,462. The studies used were the Ott 1978 study, the Bond 1986
study, and the Rinsky study estimate. These studies were converted to risk
assessments in the Environmental Protection Agency-Carcinogen Assessment Group
(EPA-CAG) estimate, the White risk assessment, and the Crump & Allen risk
assessment. Id.
75. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 34,462-63. The Crump and Allen statistical analysis used
the weighted cumulative dose and relative risk models.
76. 52 Fed. Reg. at 34,510. This represented an estimated 90 percent reduction in
excess deaths.
77. This statistical test correlates the effect of one variable on another. The API
analyzed the Rinsky study using a conditional logistic regression analysis.
78. 52 Fed. Reg. at 34,462-63. The API also based its analysis on the Rinsky study.
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interpretations, a court may be reluctant to find that OSHA's
regulation satisfies the substantial evidence requirement of
Benzene. OSHA's evidence may not be sufficient to prove its
conclusions on a "more likely than not"7 9 basis because of
apparent statistical "trickery."
As this example shows, it is difficult for OSHA to produce
scientific studies that unequivocally meet the legal standard
established for proving a reduction in risk because of OSHA's
inability to definitely quantify that risk by the elimination of
all other statistical interpretation alternatives. The question
then becomes whether a court's review of OSHA's proferred
scientific evidence under the Benzene Court's substantial evidence test would approximate the preferred level of regulation
dictated standard of risk
given the congressionally
assessment.8o
IV.

THE OPTIMAL JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC STUDIES
IN OSHA RISK ASSESSMENT

Assuming that our society values efficiency and desires to
weigh change and regulation from a cost benefit standpoint,"'
then we prefer a system of regulation that is more beneficial to
society as a whole than its alternatives. Therefore, the present
analysis of scientific evidence is preferred if benefits are maximized by the Benzene's Court's substantial evidence analysis.
Otherwise, some change in the substantial evidence analysis is
necessary to reach optimal results.
A.

PresentLaw

As discussed above, the Benzene substantial evidence standard appears to require statistical analyses or studies with a
very high statistical confidence level. Such studies may be
impossible to produce or their authority may be uncertain
because of the possibility of opposing statistical interpretations
which a court could choose to accept. Additionally, animal
79. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 653 (1980).
80. As stated above, this Article does not examine the wisdom or validity of the
Benzene Court's interpretation of the standard governing an agency's assessment of
risk as established by Congress. This Article simply examines the Court's analysis of
what constitutes substantial evidence when OSHA proposes to regulate low-exposure
carcinogens.
81. This assumption may not be entirely correct if our society values a certain
distribution of wealth rather than total wealth maximization.
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studies that are generally acceptable to the scientific community may be rejected. Furthermore, the indirect manner with
which the Benzene Court addressed the substantial evidence
standard and the resultant analyses in other cases leaves
OSHA and those who may challenge an OSHA regulation
uncertain as to whether a scientific study supported by statistical evidence can meet the Benzene test even if the regulation
might be otherwise scientifically justifiable. Thus, the present
substantial evidence standard is uncertain at best. Some regulations may be upheld and others overturned depending upon a
federal court's understanding of the Benzene substantial evidence standard and of the statistical interpretations relied
upon by OSHA in its regulatory decision.
This system can be justified from a cost-benefit standpoint
only in those cases where any federal court could determine
that OSHA's supporting studies and statistical interpretation
were scientifically more accurate than any other interpretation. It is unlikely, however, that such a situation ever occurs.
As we have seen, the benzene standards published in 1987,
which do show some correlation with risk reduction, could easily be challenged using the very same studies which supported
them. Furthermore, the federal courts of appeals cases applying the Benzene standard to OSHA regulation of low-exposure
carcinogens seem not to be in exact conformance with the Benzene standard. 2 This leaves a system where regulations may
be accepted or rejected haphazardly. Such a system will probably not maximize social benefits.
This is particularly true since the benefits of low-exposure
carcinogen regulation are usually undercounted or overcounted
because of the likelihood that most regulated substances have
similar carcinogenic properties. Much of the uncertainty in scientific studies analyzing the effects of low-exposure carcinogens comes from the lack of information on the causal
pathways of cancer. Whatever the ultimate answers are
regarding cancer causation (e.g., can one carcinogenic molecule
cause cancer), the causal pathways for many low-exposure carcinogens are likely to be similar.' Therefore, neither a system
in which studies and statistical analyses are rejected as insub82. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
83. See Hoel & Crump, Waterborne Carcinogens: A Scientist's View, in THE
SCIENTIFIC BAsIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 177 (K. Crandall & L. Lave eds.
1981).
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stantial without certain standards or guidelines nor a system
which produces uncertain outcomes with little basis in scientific realities, as the present system does, is likely to be cost
effective.
There is an additional cost that flows from the present system-litigation costs. In the area of low-exposure carcinogen
regulation, the Benzene decision has led to much disagreement
and uncertainty regarding the statistical analysis of significant
risks. In addition, the financial stakes for regulated industries
are very high. An affected industry could reasonably challenge
almost any OSHA standard regarding a low-exposure carcinogen. Even if an industry has reason to believe that its challenge would ultimately fail, if the standard could be suspended
for the course of the litigation without worry of penalties for a
frivolous claim, compliance costs could be saved or delayed
long enough to cover the cost of the legal challenge. To society
this tactic may represent a costly delay of needed regulations.
A stay of the standard pending judicial review is within the
discretion of the court,' and a court is very likely to issue such
a stay under the present system. A challenger can usually
show likelihood of success on the merits because of the uncertainty of scientific evidence and the difficulty of satisfying substantial evidence review. A challenger can usually show
likelihood of irreparable harm because of large initial compliance costs.8 5 For example, in the Benzene case, the Fifth Circuit issued a temporary stay for affected businesses for
approximately one month and another stay until the disposition of the case.6 Thus, the cost of the present system is high.
The question then becomes whether alternative ways of determining whether scientific studies constitute substantial evidence are possible or preferable.
B. Alternative Analysis
As an alternative to the present system, a reinterpretation
of the Benzene substantial evidence standard would ensure
that all future courts analyze scientific studies consistently and
in a manner that provides the highest level of societal benefit
84. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
85. See Taylor Diving & Salvage v. United States Dep't of Labor, 537 F.2d 819
(1976).
86. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 500 (1978), offd, Industrial
Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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within the established OSHA regulatory standards. Two obvious alternatives to a change in court analysis of "substantial
evidence" would be to strengthen the presumption of validity
of OSHA's scientific data or strengthen the presumption of
validity of a challenger's scientific data. The Benzene Court's
requirement that evidence must demonstrate a proposition on
a "more likely than not" basis could be interpreted so that
"definitive" studies, actual "proof" instead of statistical likelihood, are required for substantial evidence. The analysis of
OSHA's new benzene standards demonstrates that this is a
very difficult burden to bear. Both OSHA and the challenger
to the agency regulation typically rely on the same data. However, each side interprets that data differently, using differing
statistical analyses. Both analyses may be mathematically
valid but may have different levels of support in the scientific
community. Therefore, to force one side or the other to present evidence which proves rather than supports the correctness of its position would mean that almost all regulation of
low-exposure carcinogens would either pass or fail automatically. Even if low-exposure carcinogens exhibit many of the
same causation properties, neither of these alternatives are
likely to be cost efficient.
1.

Forcing OSHA to Provide Proof Rather Than Statistical
Likelihood

An interpretation of the Benzene Court's requirement for
substantial evidence requiring the agency to produce definitive
or essentially unchallengeable evidence of risk would have the
practical result of decreasing the regulation of low-exposure
carcinogens. Under such an interpretation, a court would
reject all scientific studies proffered by OSHA not unequivocally showing an increase in cancer deaths at specific exposure
levels. Forcing OSHA to provide such proof'of a needed regulation rather than a statistical probability of need would,
because of the difficulty of meeting such a level of proof, likely
reduce the amount of regulation of low-exposure carcinogens.
At the same time, this method of analysis would not appear to
increase benefits. Although litigation costs might decrease, it
seems unlikely that all of the risk assessment regulations at
the low-exposure levels are truly superfluous.8 7 Even assuming that many of these suspected carcinogens "stand or fall
87. Cranor, supra note 53, at 379.
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together" (i.e., they have the same type of causal pathways),
there are certain levels where known fatal effects occur and
grayer areas that are difficult to pin down uniformly for all
carcinogens.' Thus, requiring OSHA to provide strict "proof",
rather than a statistical likelihood, seems inefficient.
Even those who challenge regulation of carcinogens generally recognize that doses of carcinogens lower than the regulated level may also cause cancer, thus leaving only the rate of
occurrence in the question. 9 Also, in almost all examples of
risk assessment, whether it be low-exposure carcinogens or
automobile safety restraints, the risk of future death and the
health benefits of regulation may be significantly undervalued
due to the lack of immediate experimental proof.9° This does
not imply that any kind of regulation would be cost beneficial,
only that the summary denial of recognition of benefits of
some type of regulation because of a strict "proof" requirement
may be socially inefficient. Indeed, the major cost benefit criticism of most environmental and worker safety regulation is
based upon the implementation of the regulation, not the
methodology determining the risks involved.9 From a cost
benefit standpoint, requiring proof of a definitive risk reduction for a new regulation would complicate an agency's implementation regulations.
2.

Evidentiary Presumption In Favor of Agency

An interpretation of the Benzene substantial evidence
standard similar to the standard the court articulated in the
ASARCO case9 2 would permit the use of almost any study as
proof of a causal link between cancer and risk reduction.
Under this interpretation, a court could decide that a connection of any sort constituted substantial evidence. Such an easy
requirement for "substantial evidence," however, is probably
not preferred from a cost benefit standpoint. If some burden
of proof is not required of agency regulation, the agency will
88. Id.
89. See Kimm, Kuzmak & Schnare, Waterborne Carcinogens: A Regulator's View,
in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 229-233 (K. Crandall &

L. Lave eds. 1981).
90. See R. KAZis AND R. GROSSMAN, FEAR AT WORK 123-38 (1982).
91. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND

THE U.S. ECONOMY

(H.

Peskin, P. Portnoy, & A. Kneese eds. 1981) (collecting essays that discuss the possible
adverse effects of environmental regulation on economic activity and that make a
general case for the use of economic incentives in environmental policy):

92. See ASARCO, Inc. v. OSHA, 746 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984).
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likely not engage in a careful, systematic review of the scientific evidence that is available.9 3 With such meager scientific
analysis, it would be pure luck if the proposed regulation by a
regulatory agency bore a reasonable relationship to the true
benefit of regulation at that level. This would lead to the
aggrandizement of the regulating agency, or of the few who do
benefit by the regulation, and to a probable loss in total societal welfare. One much-criticized example of this approach is
California's "Proposition 65,"' which puts the burden on a regulated party to determine the appropriate level of carcinogen
regulation.95
Thus, the two most obvious solutions-requiring a showing
of definitive scientific evidence by either the regulatory agency
or its challenger-seem to offer no promise of the optimal
level of benefit to society.
3.

Other Alternatives

Enabling the courts to determine whether OSHA has successfully proffered substantial evidence by increasing the
court's understanding of the scientific, statistical, and mathematical nature of risk assessment and regulation will lead to a
more satisfactory solution. 6 Thus, this Article proposes that a
total increase in benefits could be obtained within the legal
framework of Benzene if our courts could determine the substantiality of offered evidence by reviewing the statistics and
scientific viewpoint underlying OSHA regulation and regulatory challenges in a systematic fashion.
93. See Lave, Methods of Risk Assessment, in QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT IN
REGULATION 23-54 (L. Lave ed. 1982).
94. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5 through 25249.13 (1990) (added by
Initiative Measure, approved by the people, Nov. 4, 1986).
95. See Charlott Uram, Proposition65: No Safe Harbor,NAT. RESOURCES AND THE
ENV'T. Winter 1990, vol. 4, no. 3, at 16 (for a discussion of the problems with
"Proposition 65").
96. As yet another alternative, many regulators and scientists have proposed a sort
of "seat of your pants" analysis of regulation which allows the agency to be somewhat
intuitive or "generally right" about a regulation if it has met a minimum scientific
burden and acted according to accepted scientific principles. See Crandall & Lave,
Introduction and Summary, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY
REGULATION 4-5 (R. Crandall & L. Lave eds. 1981). Though the language may sound
different, this alternative basically puts regulators and those that may challenge
regulation in the same position in which they are today-being subject to the whims of
the judiciary in determining what is current scientific knowledge or what is
scientifically reasonable. As noted earlier, the inability of the judiciary to analyze the
relative merits of these scientific studies is one of the major causes of the risk
assessment difficulty that results in a lower net benefit to society.
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To accomplish these benefits, the courts should increase
their scientific expertise through the use of a special scientific
master in the areas of current scientific theories of carcinogenesis, health risk, and mathematical theories of statistical analysis. Adoption of this proposal would eliminate some of the
uncertainty surrounding the regulatory process because all
parties would speak the same language of acceptable scientific
theory. This would also discourage or eliminate those regulations or challenges to regulations that are based only on
pseudo-scientific statistical analysis. 97 In addition, the courts
would have the tools for discerning the relevance of different
statistical analyses. The courts could then better recognize
true risks and, thus, the necessity of regulation.
C. Proposed Change in Court Analysis
When approaching a question of a risk assessment under
the Benzene standard, a specific and uniform analysis of studies upon which OSHA relies in regulating low-exposure carcinogens would result in an increase in overall benefits. This
analysis should include a uniform review of any epidemiologic
surveys or animal studies, with assistance of special masters to
determine (1) whether the results are based on well founded
correlations (i.e., the relationship between two sets of data is
interpreted correctly), and (2) whether the correlation is in the
range of statistical relevance accepted by the scientific community. Such an approach has already been proposed when a
court must examine statistical evidence in general. 9
When asked to review evidence purportedly relating
groups of people by health effects or toxic substance exposure,
courts should first subject this data to a statistical analysis. It
is often easy to be mistaken about whether a statistical relationship is significant when acting upon intuition alone (or
even when acting upon the belief of some experts). 9' Because
scientifically trained personnel are able to conduct valid statistical relationship tests with reasonable ease, courts should be
97. Of course, persons who engage in scientific endeavors disagree over specific
scientific analyses. However, certain parts of scientific analysis, such as methods of

proof and study, are commonly accepted.
98. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 453-54 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
99. Intuition is recognized as one of the major problems of risk recognition from a
Congressional level down to the parlor game level. See P.G. MOORE, THE BUSINESS OF
RISK at 49-62 (1983) for a thorough discussion of intuition and risk problems.

1991]

Analysis of Low-Exposure Carcinogens

particularly careful to require them. 1°° These tests may disclose whether a perceived relationship or disparity is truly significant, obviating the need for total reliance on expert opinion
in, the area. Requiring appropriate statistical analyses would
increase overall benefits by forcing OSHA to eliminate regulation when no acceptable scientific or statistical study can support its conclusion.
If OSHA or a party challenging a regulation offers statistical analyses as evidence, the court should analyze potential
problem areas with these tests and their underlying data to
assure that commonly accepted scientific principles underlying
statistical analyses have been followed. One basic problem
often occurring with any statistical analysis is the formulation
of correct assumptions. Whether the groups were drawn to
create a true control group and whether the group represented
is really isolable for only one particular environmental exposure must always be closely considered when evaluating epidemiologic surveys. In other words, group comparisons should
inquire into whether the only difference between the groups is
the exposure to one relevant chemical or whether other
existing factors account for statistical deviations. This issue
arose in the Benzene case when the Court dismissed a study
undertaken by Dow Chemicals because OSHA had allegedly
not considered the effects of other chemicals. 10 1
As in the Benzene case, other exposure factors may be
involved but such factors may be irrelevant if accepted scientific principles indicate that they probably would not act synergistically. A scientific master versed in current theories could
seek to determine substance interaction and could provide
some guidance to a court in determining the relevance of other
substance exposures to the proffered statistical analysis. A
court in reviewing the adequacy of such statistical epidemiologic studies, as did the Supreme Court in Benzene, must have
the tools at its disposal to analyze the relative strengths of
studies.
Under this proposed new approach, an agency could not
simply isolate any group in order to create an incidence rate,
100. See Lave, Introduction in QuANTITATIvE RISK ASSESSMENT IN REGULATION
15-17 (L. Lave ed. 1982) (The discussion of EPA regulation of photochemical oxidants
in this article is another extreme example of judicial avoidance to submit data to
statistical analysis).
101. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
631 (1980).
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but neither could a challenger successfully attack a regulation
based on the fact that other scientifically insignificant factors
were present. This new approach would increase benefits by
eliminating "false" incidents and considering true statistical
connections.
For instance, the Benzene plurality and dissenting opinions
clearly disagreed on the acceptability of the Dow study."°2
However, the plurality offered no reason for rejecting the
study other than that other chemicals might be involved. It
did not make a detailed examination of the agency's reasons
for using the study. Without such an examination, the Court
may have incorrectly discounted the validity of the Dow study
in formulating OSHA's conclusions.
A second basic question to be asked with any statistical
test is what level of significance is acceptable. Certainly, in a
carcinogenic risk assessment, a court would consider significant
a 99 percent chance that a correlation exists between cancer
incidence in a group and the level of chemicals in the workplace air. However, it is unclear whether a court would consider a figure of 80 percent or 60 percent significant. In many
parts of the scientific community, the probability that a study
indicates a false negative is set at the 95 percent level to indicate "significance," which is considered the "null hypothesis. ' '
However, this is simply a convention and may not
always be appropriate in a court's analysis of risk assessment
cases or other scientific analyses where exposure levels are
particularly low.
A court should note that it is not only the reliability of the
scientific data but also the size of the groups under consideration which determines significance. Thus, even though a correlation may be suggested by other studies, in certain cases an
affected group might be very small, making it impossible to
show a 95 percent statistical significance. Therefore, a challenger to such a statistical analysis could claim with mathematical certainty that the results are not "significant." However,
such small exposure groups, which may be common with lowexposure carcinogens, deserve closer analysis or a lower
acceptable level of significance. A scientific master could look
at data in relation to the particular statistical analyses
employed and their relation to other studies or factors and
102. See id. at 633 and 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Cranor, supra note 53, at 385.
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advise a judge in the areas in which he or she may need
explication. 1° 4
For instance, in Asbestos Information Ass'n/North
America v. OSHA 1°5 the Fifth Circuit rejected a proposed temporary standard for airborne asbestos fibers in holding that
studies supporting the standard were not definite or certain as
to the number of lives saved. In that case, OSHA was unable
to statistically demonstrate the exact number of lives that
would be saved over a period of six months, although there
was clear statistical evidence that exposure to asbestos over the
long term was a significant health risk. This does not mean
that the ultimate conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in the Asbestos
Information case was incorrect, only that the court may have
dismissed risks for lack of statistical correlations without
examining other proof which may have confirmed those risks.
A scientific master would also provide a general increase
in scientific knowledge to the court which would be beneficial
for overall analysis of test data. For instance, the use of animal
tests to measure risk of exposure is becoming increasingly controversial because of possible deaths due to the effects of toxicity. 1°6 A scientific master versed in the complex nature of
specie differences, size, and metabolism could provide an
informed opinion in this very volatile area. In addition, statistical theory may indicate that opposing statistical analyses are
both relevant. A scientific master can explain the differences
in the analyses and the importance of the information to the
court in a neutral manner. This will allow the court to make a
better and more informed decision.
The use of a scientific master in judicial review of agency
evidence could be quickly and easily implemented. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already allow for the appointment of a special master on a case-by-case basis in exceptional
circumstances. 10 7 Special masters are routinely used in environmental contaminant cases because of the threat to public
health and the complexity or difficulty of the scientific issues
104. For an excellent and thorough discussion of the relationship between sample
size and statistical significance, see Cranor, supra note 53, at 386-89.
105. Asbestos Information Ass'n/North America v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 425 (5th
Cir. 1984)).
106. Begley, These Rats Die for Our Sins, NEWSWEEK Oct. 22, 1990, at 68.

107. FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
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involved."' 8 Therefore, the adoption of special mastery would
require no legal changes and would depend only upon acceptance by the judges themselves.
Special masters can monitor the implementation of feasible statistical tests, help the court interpret the meaning of
competing statistical analyses, and provide general scientific
information to the court. As previously noted, such expertise
would have been helpful in the Benzene case and in later cases.
Providing the courts with such expertise will probably lead to
a more consistent and preferred level of regulation. Although
the use of special masters would add to the cost of litigation,
this cost would probably be offset by the time saved by the
court personnel, who would have to spend far less time becoming scientifically knowledgeable in order to begin a case. In
addition, costs would be saved by providing for a regulation
which is more predictable and consistent with the law.
V.

CONCLUSION

There are no simple, easy methods for ensuring that benefits outweigh costs in the regulation of low-exposure carcinogens. The scientific uncertainty of epidemiologic data and
animal studies used to assess risks makes this impossible at the
present time. This does not mean that regulation is unnecessary, only that the absolute optimal level of regulation is difficult to determine because the scientific studies upon which
OSHA relies are not certain. As a society, it is important to
find the method that most consistently approaches the optimal
level of regulation-the amount of regulation where society's
total benefits are maximized.
The method used by the Supreme Court to analyze
whether evidence is substantial in OSHA regulation of suspected low-exposure carcinogens does not attain optimal regulation and a net benefit to society. Likewise, an interpretation
of the substantial evidence standard requiring OSHA or the
industry challenging the regulation to provide "proof" of
effects instead of statistical likelihood would not seem to reach
the optimal amount and type of regulation.
Optimal regulation can be more closely approximated by
standardizing an approach in the federal courts to substantial
evidence review of OSHA regulation. This approach should
108. See United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 225 (W.D.
Mo. 1985) (the use of special mastery should probably be increased).
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take a close look at the scientific evidence and the mathematical formulas used to reduce such evidence to a risk assessment.
In addition, a scientist's critical eye should be added to
examine the underlying presumptions relied on in risk assessments. By using this approach, our courts could eliminate the
most egregious examples of superfluous regulation or regulatory challenge, thus making regulation itself more certain.
This system would also bring the court into line with the most
correct scientific assumptions in the risk assessment area and
allow quick changes to accompany advances in scientific certainty when they occur. This type of analysis is a possible way
to maximize societal benefits in the regulation of low-exposure
carcinogens.

